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PROLOGUE 
1 11Denn nur durch vergleichung unterscheidet man sich und 
erfihrt, was man ist, um ganz zu werden, was man sein soll 11 
1 11For only by making comparisons can we distinguish ourselves 
from others and discover who we are, in order to become all that 
we are meant to be11 
The quotation is taken from David P Currie: The constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. 
SUMMARY 
Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries 
German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional 
Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted 
infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibling still lacks identity is 
evidenced by our Constitutional Court's evasive and superficial treatment of the 
clause. Section 33(1)(a) - proportionality prong enables judges to justify their 
neglect of Section 33(1)(b). The opinion is expressed that Section 33(1){b) 
demands interpretation but to date it has been shrouded in vagueness. After 
all without demarcating boundaries with sufficient precision and highlighting 
where the State may not tread the State may trespass. Alternatively the 
limitable nature of human rights could become a myth as Section 33(1)(b) could 
be transformed into an insurmountable hurdle for the State, rendering every 
right absolute in practice. A workable conceptual framework proposes an 
inverted, porous and value imbibing solution. 
KEY TERMS 
Analysis of Section 33(1)(b); Borrowed Provisions; Complex Interpretative 
Conundrums; Insurmountable Obstacle; Myopic Guidance - enter our 
Constitutional Court; Academic Opinion; Boundary Demarcation; Prognosis of 
Working Draft Re:- Section 35(1 )(b); Solution: Inverted value orientated/residual 
approach. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: 11A BRIDGE TOO FAR11? 
The drafters of the Interim Constitution, academics and a host of Court 
decisions concur that the pivotal clause in our Constitution is the 
limitation clause - section 33111 • 
Fleshing out a consistent and meaningful limitation clause remains a 
daunting task. In this paper I will attempt to elucidate the genesis of our 
section 33{1)(b) before scrutinizing the myopic guidelines exemplified by 
our Constitutional Courtl2l. I am of the view that the essential content of 
a right {section 33{1){b)) should be removed from the category of a "paper 
tiger11 (3) / figure head to take its place as a finely tuned yet elastic concept. 
It is trite law that the interim Constitution seeks or aspires to be:-
<4l "A historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided 
society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and 
injustice, and a future found on the recognition of human 
rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and 
development of opportunities for all South Africans 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. 11 
Etienne Mureinik submits that the point of the Bill of Rights is to 
spearhead the effort to bring about a culture of justification. He continues 
to add:-
1 
(5) "If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a cultural 
authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It must lead 
to a culture of justification - a culture in which every exercise 
of power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership 
given by government rests on the cogency of the case 
offered in its defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired 
by the force at its command. The new order must be 
community built on persuasion, and not coercion". 
The same writer opines that the limitation clause is a provision which 
empowers the government to override the Bill's fundamental rights and 
hence it authorises the government to justify or to defend laws which 
clash with the rights appearing in the Bill161 • Therefore according to 
Mureinik the limitation clause has the potential to be a soft underbelly of 
the Bill of Rightsm. He continues to add that unless it is narrow and 
precise, it could make the rights in the Bill easy to trump no matter how 
strongly they are worded. Erasmus too alludes to the general principle 
of interpreting limitations strictly so that the right is more often than not 
protected whilst the limitation becomes the exception(8). Other decisions 
compatible with this approach include the dicta in Handyside(9) as well as 
the decision in OAKES110J. It is submitted that the converse argument 
remains largely unexplored and unanswered. Is it possible for a limitation 
clause to be too tautly strung? This lacuna underlies the main purpose 
of this paper which is to explore the premise of creating an 
insurmountable hurdle for the State or a bridge too far by tightening the 
2 
limitation clause to strangulation point. It is submitted that Justice 
Hiemstra's prescient dicta in Smith1111 identified this conundrum over 
twenty years ago:-
11The Court has a particular duty as guardian of liberty, but it 
• 
has to exercise its powers of controlling legislation with a 
scalpel and not with a sledgehammer .11 
Taken to its logical conclusion this judicial activism enabled by an "over-
strung" limitation clause could have the effect of transforming theoretically 
!imitable rights into absolutes and thereby rendering the limitation clause 
obsolete. 
2. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW - 11PLUCKING BMWS AND 
SOWING OAKES11• 
Why the Interim Constitution chose to adopt rather than create has sowed 
a recipe for disaster. TRIBE stresses the importance of making 
constitutional choices highlighting a multi-facetted team of protagonists. 
Identified actors include inter alia : judges, presidents, governors, 
legislators, lawyers, scholars, government bureaucrats, writers and 
historians. To TRIBE:-
(12) 
"the Constitution is in part the sum of all these choices. But 
it is also more than that. It must be more if it is to be a 
source either of critique or of legitimation. Thus, just as the 
Constitutional choices we make are channelled and 
3 
constrained by who we are and by what we have lived 
through, so too they are constrained and channelled by a 
constitutional text and structure and history by constitutional 
language and constitutional tradition, opening some paths 
and foreclosing others. 11 
Besides emphasizing the importance of choice TRIBE is also highlighting 
the unique 11home-grown11 quality of the American Constitution conceived, 
nurtured and catapulted into use against is own historical backdrop. This 
is a common factor amongst Constitutions across the globe ensuring an 
assorted variety of distinct end-products. All have responded to their own 
judicial climate, culture and history culminating in domestically friendly 
and appropriate documents. 
Hence the German1131 , Canadian1141 and lndian1151 Constitutions have not 
simply regurgitated the American Constitution and called it their own nor 
have they opted for internal modifiers 11limitations11 like the American strict 
scrutiny I rational connection test1161• In fact KENTRIDGE J exemplified this 
argument in ZUMA117J referring with approval to the dicta in FISCHER AND 
BIG M DRUG MART LTD. 
11But Lord Wilberforce and Dickson J emphasised that regard 
must be paid to the legal history, traditions, and usages .Qt 
the country concerned, if the purposes of its Constitution are 
to be fully understood. This must be right. 11 
A fortiori the uniqueness and home-grown qualities should be 
encapsulated in the written text. 
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In stark contrast the second half of our limitation clause appears strikingly 
similar to article 19(2) of the German Bill:-
118> "In Keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem 
Wesensgehalt angetastet werden" 
"In no case may the essence of a basic right be encroached 
upon" 
Section 33(1 )(b) of our Constitution provides:-
(19) 
"Shall not negate the essential content of the right in 
question" 
Whilst the Canadian limitation clause reads as follows:-
(20) "guarantees set out in [the CHARTER] subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society" 
Section 33(1)(a) of our Constitution reads:-
(21) 
"The rights entrenched in this chapter may be limited by law 
of general application, provided that such limitation (a) shall 
be permissable only to the extent that it is :-
(i) reasonable and 
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality:• 
Again our provision bears more than a striking resemblance to its 
Canadian cousin whose heritage is itself German based. CURRIE submits 
that this balancing and proportionality prong was introduced by the 
Magna Carta and developed by BLACKSTONE. During the German 
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Enlightenment CARL GOTTLIEB SVAREZ elaborated and developed the 
proportionality concept:-
(221 
"First the State was justified in restricting the liberty of the 
individual only to the extent necessary for the liberty and 
security of others and secondly the evil to be prevented must 
be substantially greater than the attendant harm to individual 
liberty.11 
It is respectfully submitted that the Canadian formula in OAK.E~ in 
essence captures both Svarez components. Counsel appearing before 
both our Supreme(24) and Constitutional Courts (25) have relied heavily on 
this formula as enunciated by DICKSON J. Despite KENTRIDGE J's 
caveat in ZUMAf.161 re: Section 33(1)(a) 
11 
•• .I see no reason in this case at least, to attempt to fit our 
analysis into the Canadian pattern. 11 
The learned judge did not expressly reject OAKES(27). 
In the light of the brief overview it is apparent that our limitation clause is 
suffering from an identity crisis. Instead of weaving a genuine sui-generis 
clause from our soil we have spawned a mongrel. This is in spite of DE 
WAAL'S warning:-
(28) 
"like any other Constitution, the basic law is more than a tree 
from which one can pluck little BMWs which could happily be 
driven on South African roads. 11 
Unperturbed by questionable lineage WOOLMAN submits that:-
6 
~ ''the limitation clause is a beast of reasonable temperament, 
and one that can be brought to heel if properly understood." 
I am of the opinion that this optimistic "understanding" of Section 33(1)(b) 
has yet to be exhibited by both the German(30) and South African 
Constitutional Courts1311 • 
3. LOGIC VS REALITY - "SURVIVING IN A STORM OF 
SPECULATION" 
(32) 
The demise of parliamentary sovereignty was signalled by the following:-
"The Constitutional Court shall have the jurisdiction in the Republic 
as the court of final instance over all matters relating to the 
interpretation, protection and enforcement of the provision of this 
Constitution." 
This novel provision struck a chord amongst academics and a flood of 
literature followed in its wake(33). Early articles concentrated on our 
sovereign Constitution, the advantages of International Law, the 
broadening of locus standi, the American and Canadian Bill of Rights and 
much speculation over the composition and tasks of a reformed 
judiciary(34). 
Prior to the birth of "our" Bill much attention was devoted to the 
Appellate Division's interpretation of the Bophutswana and Namibian Bill 
of Rights. Criticism over the positivist- literalist approach as enunciated 
in the infamous trio of SEGALE(35), MONNAKALE(:lS) and LEWIS(37) reached 
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its apogee in SMITH(38) and remains valid despite preceding these 
decisions. In this decision HIEMSTRA C J preferred a "revolutionary" 
approach advocating a comparative enquiry and a divorce from 
positivism(39). Despite a succinct and erudite exposition of Constitutional 
interpretation it is respectfully submitted that HIEMSTRA C J may have 
inadvertently and tacitly sanctioned a culture of borrowing. After all 
being forced to escape from the existing trend of stale literalism left little 
option other than to seek guidance elsewhere - viz Germany(40) and the 
United States1411 • I hold the view that this culture of "guidance" has been 
distorted and abused by the drafters of the Interim Constitution, Court 
decisions and some academics1421• In essence the dye had been cast 
albeit in an interim mould for the troubled mongrel's South African debut. 
In its wake lay a convoluted cloak of comparative "cousins" of 
questionable lineage. By far the most unrelated being the American 
11cousin 11 devoid of any express limitation lineage. Nevertheless 
PROFESSOR MUREINIK was prompted to comment in this regard :-
(43) 
"Because the United States has been interpreting Bills 
of Rights longer than anybody else and there is a 
whole lot more law there than anywhere else, we will 
be looking at American law probably more than at any 
other system." 
I submit that this is a particularly puzzling comment in the light of our 
recognition of the importance of an express limitation clause and the 
American omission of same. Without delving too deeply into the dense 
8 
and often irrelevant jungle of American Constitutionalism I submit that 
misguided speculation underlines the conflict between logic and reality. 
Whether the speculation pertains to the importance of foreign decisions, 
foreign Bills of Rights or the interpretation and prognosis of our own Bill 
the American Chief Justice WACHTLERS' caveat should be noted. The 
learned Chief Justice referred to and approved HOLME&' ~ :- . 
(44) 
"The life of the common law has not been logic, it has 
been experience, but when it relies solely upon logic 
and from the perspective of the common law process 
the rule of law produced is stillborn." 
If one emphasises "the logic of speculation" only to produce a stillborn 
product wherein lies its value? WACHTLER submits that the Court 
provides the key :-
(45) 
"It is the court, however, that applies law directly to 
real persons. It is in court where the collision 
between law and real - world events take place . It is 
the judge who must, in every case, consider the 
discreet predicaments of specific persons, look these 
persons directly in the eye, and explain how the law 
affects them." 
Despite a genetic hybrid of a limitation clause the 11 constant 
bombardment of real life events 11 described as the central ingredient by 
WACHTLER 11in the crucible of the lawsuit, (of real-world events and 
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persons)"'46J could have solidified Section 33(1)(b) - enter our 
Constitutional Court ....... . 
4. ENTER THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
A. IGNORING THE INFANT IN ZUMA 
A brief synopsis of the Judge's interpretation of Section 33 (1) (b) 
highlights the foreign infant's failed acclimatisation. 
In ZUMA, the first Constitutional case, KENTRIDGE A J conceded that our 
Section 33(1)(a) was virtually akin to Section 1 of the Canadian Charter<47l. 
Without expressly rejecting the Canadian proportionality test as 
enunciated in OAKES146J the learned Judge warned against fitting our 
analysis into the Canadian pattern1491• The crux of the decision did 
however revolve around the proportionality test which exemplified much 
of OAKES(50)... : 
(51) 11The tests of reasonableness, justifiability and 
necessity are not identical, and in applying each of 
them individually one will not always get the same 
results. But in this particular instance reasonableness, 
justification and necessity may be looked at and 
assessed together" 
In essence the rationale and purpose of the legislation was simply 
measured against the consequent harm of infringing the right. The 
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reverse burden was felt to be too onerous when weighed against Section 
25 (2) and thus the State failed to justify its action. Effectively the 
proportionality prong prevailed despite the learned Judge's lengthy ~ 
stressing the so called principles of interpretation - and the importance 
of home grown traditionsl52l. In summary, three major criticisms may be 
levelled at KENTRIDGE A J. Firstly despite his voluminous exposition of 
constitutional interpretation he failed to link these principles to the actual 
interpretation of Section 33(53). It is respectfully submitted that Section 33 
is the "engine room" of the interpretive process and I would therefore 
concur with Professor Davis that KENTRIDGE A J missed a golden 
opportunity to sketch the parameters of a judicial landscape instead of 
touching on tentative guideposts(54). Instead the learned Judge echoed 
Section 1 of.the Canadian Charter and sought refuge in proportionality(56). 
Secondly, the learned Judge portrayed an overly tentative, cautious and 
restrictive approach by concluding ... : 
(58) 
"It is important, I believe, to emphasise what this 
judgment does not decide. It does not decide that all 
statutory provisions which create presumptions in 
criminal cases are invalid. This court recognises that 
in some cases the prosecution may require reasonable 
presumptions to assist it in this task. 11 
Finally and not totally divorced from this under inclusive tone is the 
omission to acknowledge the existence of the adopted sibling viz Section 
33 (1) (b). Perhaps the learned Judge opined that the proportionality 
11 
prong had not been cleared and hence the State's attempt at justification 
had failed. It could be argued therefore, that any mention of the sibling 
would be irrelevant and the problem child issue should be dealt with at a 
later stage. With respect this argument has cemented an ethos of 
omission, neglect and a culture of procrastination when dealing with the 
affairs of the adopted sibling(57). 
B. ACKr,IOWLEDGING, NEGLECTING BUT NOT DECIDING IN MAKWANYANE. 
In the death penalty case (MAKWANYANE) all eleven Judges concurred 
that the death penalty was unconstitutional{58). Juxtaposed to such 
unanimity was the diverse and varied degrees of attention bestowed on 
Section 33(1) (b). The JUDGE PRESIDENT CHASKALSON acknowledged 
its existence, touched on its ancestry, severe domestic teething problems 
and questioned whether it should be viewed objectively, subjectively or 
both. Nevertheless he concluded as follows :-
(59) 
• It is, however, not necessary to solve this problem in 
the present case. At the very least the provision 
evinces concern that, under the guise of limitation, the 
rights should not be taken away altogether." 
With respect one wonders what value such an acknowledgment has 
without attempting to provide some conceptual framework to nourish the 
problem child. 
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ACKERMANN J. felt it necessary to summarise CHASKALSQN's views on 
Section 33(1)(b)(60). With regard to the objective and subjective approach 
the learned Judge expressed a hint of disagreement over the Judge 
President's views regarding the objective approach(61>. In effect a 
summary, and a hint of criticism epitomised ACKERMAN J's neglect of 
the infant before concluding : -
(82) 
• in my view it is unnecessary in the present case to 
say anything at all about the meaning to be attached 
to this provision. Without the fullest exposition of, 
and argument on, inter alia, the German jurisprudence 
in this regard, I consider it undesirable to express any 
view on the subject." 
DIDCOTT J's dicta regarding Section 33(1)(b) differed from his 
predecessors in two respects. Firstly despite the fact that "it is better I 
therefore feel, not to go into the question on this occasion, but to leave 
that open for consideration and decision on a different one when it has 
to be answered 11(63), the learned Judge could not resist a tentative prod at 
the infant. This arises from the following statement:-
1641 " Perhaps the essential content of the right to life is negated .... .n. 
This is remarkable in light of the State's failure to meet the requirements 
of Section 33(1)(a) and (aa). The significance of this comment will be 
explored in greater detail at a later stage. Secondly, DIDCQTT J. 
progresses from CHA$KAL§ON's superficial simplification of "rights not 
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being taken away altogether"(65) by conceding that Section 33(1)(b) is 
indeed a troubled and complex problem child. This is evident from the 
following ~ :-
(86) 
"Negating the essential content of a constitutional 
right is a concept less simple and clear than it may at 
first appear to be. n 
KENTRIDGE A J begins by concurring with the Judge President that • our 
decision in this case can be reached without requiring the Court to give 
an authoritative interpretation of that Clause"(67). In contrast to 
ACKERMAN ,I, KENTRIDGE A J agrees that sufficient argument was heard 
to elicit some response(68). In his generous acknowledgment of the infant 
the learned Judge favours an objective approach169). Effectively, his 
Lordship is concentrating on laws that apply for most people at most 
times and the use and enjoyment of same. Translated into the present 
scenario this would result in a convicted murderer's execution not 
negating the essential content of his right to life. After all viewed 
objectively most people were not convicted of murder and therefore their 
right to life remains intact(70). Furthermore such law abiding citizens would 
enjoy an added dimension of safety and security on the annihilation of the 
accused. In essence this bizarre 11juggling act11 only serves to enhance the 
quality of our right to life only when a fellow human being is obliterated. 
Despite the extreme and irreversible plight of the executed felon the 
objective approach insists on focusing on 11most other people11 • Another 
criticism linked to his Lordship's attachment to the objective approach is 
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the manner in which he dismisses the subjective approachf71>. In an 
attempt to justify his conclusion KENTRIDGE A J sketches a hypothetical 
situation of a prisoner serving a jail sentence for committing a serious 
crime. He then questions how this prisoner's right to freedom, to leave 
the country, or to pursue a livelihood anywhere in the national territory is 
not negated during his jail sentence(72). Surely the duration of the 
imprisonment is the nub of the issue. His Lordship can hardly be 
advocating that a prisoner serving a twenty year jail sentence has been 
deprived of these rights on a permanent basis? With respect an answer 
of 11yes 11 could have absurd and farcical consequences culminating in most 
necessary and justifiable State measures negating the essential content 
of a right. Furthermore it is submitted that the German decision in 86 
Bverf GE 288 1992 provides the solution: 
" The State strikes at the very heart of human dignity 
if (it) treats the prisoner without regard to the 
development of his personality and strips him of ever 
regaining his freedom."f73> 
Further support appears in 45 ever GE :-
" life imprisonment does not negate the essential content of the 
rights to human dignity, equality or personal freedom, so long as 
the individual has a reasonable prospect for parole and release 
based upon his good behaviour. 11 f74l 
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In other words life imprisonment without any chance of parole was held 
to be unconstitutional as the "very heart" of the right to human dignity 
was obliterated. Conversely a prisoner, or even a so called long term 
inmate would not have had the essential content of the right to freedom 
negated if his life sentence only spanned over a period of fifteen or 
twenty years(75). 
I am of the view that the ~ in this decision should be followed by our 
Constitutional Court. Furthermore, there may well be merit in the 
subjective approach despite KENTRIDGE A J's rejection of same(78). 
MAHOMED J. concurs with his predecessors that it is unnecessary to 
decide on the problem at present and the sibling's future should be left 
openfT7l. He does however provide a germ of hope by elucidating on a 
third approach outside of the objective I subjective approaches. This so 
called relative approach could become a kernel concept in coping with 
Section 33 1 (b)(78). My criticisms of MOHAMED J are twofold. Firstly he 
touches on, yet fails to elaborate on this approach:-
(79) "We have not heard proper argument on any of these 
distinctions which justify debate in the future in a 
proper case. I say no more." 
Furthermore the choice of the term 11relative11 has certain negative 
connotations which I will illuminate on during the course of my argument. 
It is submitted that a coherent development of the positive components 
of this school of thought possesses the potential to rescue the sibling 
from a premature demise. 
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Other Justices that hinted at launching a possible rescue of Section 33 (1) 
(b) were LANGA(BO), MADALA1811, MOKGORO(ll2) and o· REGAN(83). Despite 
no express acknowledgment of the sibling their emphasis on underlying 
values and ubuntu could be of great assistance to the infant. 
l<RIEGLER J. was content to treat Section 33(1)(b) in a manner not 
dissimilar from that of KENTRIDGE A J in the ZUMA(84) case. To justify his 
neglect the Judge emphasised proportionality before summarising the 
orphan's future:-
(85) "In respect thereof I express no opinion." 
A prima facie reading of the final judgment reveals little. SACHS J. 
concurs with his brother's conclusion, emphasises proportionality and 
elaborates on values186). However on closer analysis I submit that the 
learned Judge has authoritively acknowledged and supported a subjective 
approach to Section 33(1)(b) albeit disguised under a cloak of 
proportionality. Evidence of such includes: -
(87) 
(88) 
"At its core, constitutionalism is about the protection 
and development of rights, not their extinction." 
"Even if one applies an objective approach in relation 
to the enjoyment of the right to life, namely, that the 
State is under a duty to create conditions to enable all 
persons to enjoy the right, in my view this cannot 
mean that the State's function can be extended to 
encompass complete, intentional and avoidable 
obliteration of any person's subjective right. n 
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(89) 
"Thus, execution ceases to be a punishment of a 
human being in terms of a constitution, and becomes 
instead the obliteration of a sub human from the 
purview of the constitution." 
PROFESSOR DAVIS opined prior to this Judgment regarding Section 
33(1)(b) :-
!90) 
"It might thus be that the Constitutional Court will 
provide clearer guidelines as to the meaning of the 
phrase." 
With respect the already murky waters surrounding the orphan have been 
clouded further by CHASKALSON J 1911 ' KENTRIDGI; A J (WC!)' 
ACKERMANN J (93) and KRIEGLER J 1941• Despite no express recognition 
of the infant from LANGA J (95), MADALA J (96), MOKGORO J (97), and 
O'REGAN J (98} it is submitted that their reference to ubuntu and values 
may contribute indirectly to his rescue. Perhaps the real key to his 
survival was presented by DIDCOTT J (99), MAHOMED J 1100) and SACHS J 11011• 
I hope to develop their tentative arguments during the remainder of my 
discussion in order to keep the orphan afloat. 
C. SUBSEQUENT CLARIFICATION ? 
Since MAKWANYANE 1102) there have been a host of other judgments 
handed down by our Constitutional Court1103). To date the constant 
bombardment of real life issues in Court has not comforted or consoled 
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the foreign infant<104). Troubled by his past and left unresolved by the 
Constitutional Court his acclimatisation remains unrealised. In a tigerish 
effort to live he turns his attention to academic opinion - perhaps his last 
gasp? 
s. ARMING THE PAPER TIGER 
A. WITHOUT CLAWS 
From the aforegoing discussion the following questions have arisen :-
Firstly, how fatal a flaw will the borrowed lineage prove to be? Secondly, 
is there any conceptual framework to assist interpretation? Of course the 
exploration of both questions remains futile if the infant is viewed as 
merely a figurehead or "paper tiger" 1105). Advocates of this school of 
thought justify their conclusion by focusing their enquiry predominantly 
on "the wonders of proportionality - Section 33(1)(a)" to the exclusion of 
the remainder of Section 33 1106). Nevertheless, despite his "paper tiger" 
conclusion WOOLMAN finds it necessary to question the lineage of the 
beast :-
(107) 
" At first blush the essential content prong looks to be 
the most troublesome element in a limitation clause 
test : most troublesome because it was untimely 
ripped from the German basic law and placed in an 
interim constitution which contains none of the basic 
law's particular safeguards 11 • 
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With respect, is there any point in delving back into a troubled childhood 
if the fully grown Section 33 1 {b) is predominantly a •paper tiger"? 
WOOLMAN's argument is three-tiered. Firstly, he alludes to the rareness 
of actually negating the essential content of a right 1108). Secondly, he 
emphasises the temporary nature of most right infringements1109J and 
thirdly he succumbs to the "wonders of proportionality" by concluding 
(110) 
that:-
"Most of these cases will require the careful analysis 
of closely balanced State and individual interests - and 
not a threshold determination about whether the 
essential content of the individual right has been 
negated." 
The following criticisms may be levelled at WOOLMAN's approach:-
Dealing simultaneously with his submissions, is there any merit in retiring 
the infant to figurehead status because most cases will be decided on 
proportionality? The major criticism is therefore the assumption that the 
limitation clause consists solely of Section 33 {1){a) in practice. In 
MAKAWANYANE11111 of what assistance, if any, would this approach be if 
the proportionality prong had been cleared? In other words what if the 
Court had upheld the State's argument that the death penaHy was 
reasonable and justifiable in a democratic country based on freedom and 
equality? It is therefore submitted that any conceptual guidelines 
pertaining to the interpretation of Section 33{1){b) remain largely 
unexplored. 
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The second criticism stems from the rejection of the written word. It is 
trite law that Constitutional interpretation is sui generis rather than a slave 
to the archaic literalist principles of the interpretation of Statutes111:1). 
However, I am of the opinion that the inclusion of Section (33)(1)(b), albeit 
a problematic one, demands attention rather then abandonment. I would 
therefore concur with the following :-
11131 "This (WOOLMAN's) point of view, however, does not 
accord with the rules of interpretation of constitutions 
containing a bill of rights. These rules state that every 
word has to be given a meaning in order to define the 
intention of the framers, and to give life to the purpose 
and spirit of the constitution. The clause essential 
content should therefore be interpreted and not merely 
discarded.n 
It is submitted that the inclusion of a clawless "paper tigern provision 
fraught with interpretative difficulties serves to enhance the appeal of 
proportionality. After all the temptation of discarding the complex infant 
becomes compelling when viewed against the proportionality prong. 
B. WITH CLAWS 
I am of the view that Section 33(1)(b) is of seminal importance. However 
its questionable lineage has enhanced its interpretative complexity11141• 
Consequently most attempts at moulding a conceptual framework remain 
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vague and unresolved1115J. Furthermore, a coherent limitation clause 
should exhibit and portray an internal equilibrium. One prong of the 
Clause (example Section 33(1)(a) should not therefore smother another 
(example Section 33(1)(b)) simply because it is easier to decipher. It is 
therefore submitted that the domination of proportionality (Section 
33(1)(a)) should be replaced by a harmonious and complimentary 
relationship between Sections 33 (1) (a) and (b). Pursuant to this end is 
the rejection of the •paper tiger" myth and the realisation that the infant's 
future demands interpretation111t1J. Implicit in the development of a 
workable interpretative and conceptual framework is the caveat of 
duplication. Any interpretative framework must therefore be careful not 
to subrogate the negative components of proportionality into Section 
33(1)(b). As DE VILLE and DE WAAL correctly submit this would be 
·, 
tantamount to a repetition or duplication of the proportionality prong1117J. 
C. UPSIDE DOWN WITH CLAWS AND TEETH 
. To date the most attractive option tendered to the orphan originate from 
Supreme Court Judgments 11181 • In NORT JE11191 MARAIS J. otters a logically 
sound solution to the interpretative conundrum of Section 33(1)(b). 
However, before discussing his suggestion it must be noted that the 
learned Judge opines that the sibling is indeed too tightly strung therefore 
creating an insurmountable hurdle for the State or a bridge too far :-
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(120) 
"It (section 33(1}(b) ) is a remarkable provision. In 
their understandable zeal to ensure that the 
fundamental rights conferred in chapter 3 remain 
undiluted as far as possible, the framers of the 
provision appear to have brought about a rigidity and 
inflexibility which society may come to regret. While 
acknowledging the need for some dilution where the 
interests of society require it, the framers of the 
provision have largely disabled the courts from 
responding to the need, by insisting that the essential 
content of the right shall not be negated." 
Despite his Lordship's legitimate concern for the orphan he correctly 
acknowledges that 
(121) 
"we are obliged to give effect to the provision as best 
we can.11 
This in itself is a commendable step towards acknowledging and 
interpreting the orphan rather than seeking refuge in the proportionality 
, prong viz. Section 33(1}(a). Secondly, and most importantly, MARAIS J. 
provides a feasible suggestion towards the development of an 
interpretative "coping mechanism". His Lordship opines as follows :-
11221 "Relatively little consideration has been given to the 
question of whether that form of privilege negates the 
essential content of the right conferred by section 23. 
That, to me, should ordinarily be the first matter for 
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consideration. Not only because it would be pointless 
to examine such questions as reasonableness, 
justification in an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality, or even necessity, if the 
proposed limitation negates the essential content of 
the entrenched right." 
In KHALA<123> MYBURGH J, expressly acknowledges this school of thought by 
commencing his analysis with Section 33(1)(b)11241 • In so doing his Lordship 
provides cogent support for the 11upside - down11 approach despite being 
ostensibly shackled by the proportionality hierarchy of Section 33(1)(a). 
I respectfully submit that reversing the infant into the firing line is a logically 
sound contention. As MARAIS J correctly argues why wade through the 
proportionality prongs when the essential content of the right would have been 
negated anyway <125J? Furthermore, commencing with the inverted infant would 
force some of the reluctant Constitutional Court Judges to wrestle with the 
problem child. 
D. UPSIDE DOWN WITH CLAWS, TEETH AND VALUES 
Previously I argued that Constitutional Court Judges L.AHGA<12S), 
MADALA1127l, MOKGORO <126) AND O'REAGAN <126) had somehow provided 
a germ of hope for the sibling. I submit that their reference to values 
could have far reaching results for Section 33(1)(b) when read with 
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MARAIS J's submissions in NORT JE 1130) and MYBURGH J's approach in 
KttALA <1311• I would therefore agree with WOOLMAN when he commented 
that "the content of a right is really no more than the values and practices 
the right is designed to support11321." Furthermore, LOURENS lends 
support to this submission by contending that "it seems necessary to 
define the borders of values in a democratic society as this lies the basis 
of the essential content clause"11331• Despite recurring values like ubuntu, 
reconciliation, justification and the creation of a human rights culture each 
right should remain value specific. Sufficient flexibility should surround 
the interpretation of each right in every separate instance. To marry this 
value orientated approach with the inverted infant would, I submit, 
contribute to the resurrection of Section 33{1)(b). Furthermore the 
language of the infant is couched in clumsy legalese confounded further 
by the use of a negative viz. "shall not negate the essential content of a 
right". At first glance perhaps this explains why the drafters of the new 
working draft Constitution ostensibly omitted to include him11341• However 
on closer analysis Section 35 (1) {b) appears to be the Constitutional 
Committees version of revamping the infant11351• With respect, instead of 
providing conceptual guidelines, the working draft appears to have armed 
the already vexed infant with a limitless myriad of personalities. The 
phrase "nature of the right" is as broad as it is imprecise lending the 
Constitutional Court Judges an opportunity to masquerade as 
"philosopher kings1111361 • This hazy numerus clausus would divert the 
interpretative process into an esoteric and philosophical debate 
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transforming the problem child into a disturbed and malleable misfit. 
There criticisms are confounded further by the working drafts continued 
reliance and support for the proportionality prong instead of commencing 
with an analysis of the actual right in question. The shortcomings 
inherent in Section 35 (1) (b) could be avoided by replacing the present 
version of Section 33(1)(b) with :-
33 LIMITATION - The rights entrenched in this chapter may be 
limited by law of general application provided that such limitation 
shall be permissible only to the extent that the core value (s) of 
each right remains: 
(i) intact; 
(ii) reasonable, and 
(iii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality. 
To avoid exchanging one poison for another I intend to revisit the death 
penalty case in order to "test drive" the revamped infant. 
6. WRESTLING WITH THE REVAMPED INFANT 
A. A HYPOIHECAL TEST - REVISITING MAKWANYANE 
How would the Constitutional Court now interpret the revamped infant? 
Would the Court's decision now be drastically altered? The answer will 
unfold as MAKWANJANE 1137) is revisited . Suffice to say at present that 
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the significance of the revamped orphan could stem more from its useful 
interpretative functioning and conceptual demarcation than from its result 
metamorphosis. 
The application of a two-tiered approach would still set the interpretative 
process in motion. In other words has a right been infringed? If yes, then 
the onus shifts to the State to justify such intrusion. How would the 
application of Section 33 now function in light of its revamped nature? It 
is submitted that the first leg would encapsulate an analysis of the core 
value/s of the particular right. This would be a separate enquiry from 
ascertaining general values like ubuntu which would remain as constants 
or yardsticks. In identifying specific values inherent in the right to life it 
is vital to acknowledge a realistically orientated approach stressing values 
and their relationship with reality at the time of interpretation. SMENDS' 
<138) approach would be compatible with the following Judge's .Qi!rul in 
MAKWANYANE 11391 ; LANGA 1140), MADALA 11411 , MOKGOR0'1q, AND 
O'REAGAN 11431 as much of their emphasis focuses on values. In addition, 
SMENDS' 11441 approach also reconciles WACHTLER's11451 earlier caveat by 
acknowledging that values do not exist in a vacuum. 
They are instead shaped by the constant bombardment of real life events 
with each unique contextual instance<146J. Critics of this approach like 
eOcKENFORDE argue that 11there is no sign as yet of either a rational 
justification for values, let alone an order of values, or a rationally 
recognisable and debatable system for weighting and ranking values ... .ln 
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""11111111111 
practical terms it serves as a cloak for case by case interpretation and 
adjudication111147J. In order to avoid such pitfalls I submit that those 
engaged in interpreting specific values should not merely reach a 
decision and only then justify their conclusion by referring to apparent 
values. Instead they should begin by identifying and listing specific core 
value/s of a particular right. What specific core values underlie the right 
to life? Prior to MAKWANYANE11481, RUDOLPH posed the identical question 
- "What human value is it that the right is designed to protect?11<149) His 
answer reflects a literal approach not dissimilar from SACHs' judgment in 
MAKWANYANE 1150)11 
"Being alive is in a sense, like being pregnant, you 
either are or you are not .... Right to life means the 
individual has the right to live and the right to breath 
and so the essential nature of the right to life is just 
that - being alive .. The value behind that right is that 
the all members of society have the right to live their 
lives until naturally their lives come to an end .. 111151> 
I would therefore submit that the specific values encapsulated would 
include the opportunity to function as a civilised human being, self 
respect, respect for human life and dignity, tolerance of others, ubuntu 
and reconciliation. 
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(B) RENAMING THE INFANT 
Before renaming the sibling I would like to extend and elaborate on 
MAHOMED J's germ of hope. The learned Judge discussed a relative 
approach whose origins may be traced back to Germany1521• In 
accordance with the German interpretation of this approach the emphasis 
is on values and the balancing of same 11531• Regrettably, the term relative 
approach smacks of the proportionality which as DE VILLE and DE WAAL 
correctly submit would be tantamount to duplication <154J. (See my 
previous discussion in this regard). However, despite potential 
shortcomings in name, Judge MAHOMED did provide a mould from which 
to launch the revamped infant:-
"By distinguishing the cental core of the right from its 
peripheral outgrowth .. of not invading the core as 
distinct from the peripheral outgrowth.1111551 
This approach could, I submit, provide the foundations for a successful 
revamping of the infant viz. (The new Section 33.) Perhaps the term 
"residual - value orientated approach" would assist in forging a working 
solution for the infant? Translating this residual approach into the 
revamped infant the question remains which (identified) core values 
remain intact? To assist in answering, a host of German writers provide 
an aftermath or hypothetical scenario <156). They ask the question 1What 




KROGER 11581 submits that the underlying purpose of the right should still 
be intact after limitation whilst STEIN 11581 argues that the bearers 
personality must still be capable of development. DURIG's 1160) emphasis 
is on the maintenance and existence of human dignity. 
It is respectfully submitted that not one of the core residual values 
identified earlier would remain intact if viewed subjectively. I would 
therefore concur with PIEROTH and SCHLINK 11611 , DIDCQU J. 1162J (to a 
lesser extent), MARAIS J 1163), SACHS J 11641 , HENDRICKS, MOUNZ, SJEIN, 
VON HIPPEL 1165), OLIVER 1166) and CORBETT J 1167) that it is the individual 
whose rights or whose core values are threatened who is of paramount 
importance. Revisiting MAKWANYANE 1168) in light of the revamped -
residual infant, the failure of the State to leave intact sufficient identified 
core values would complete the enquiry. Accordingly it would be 
unnecessary to assess Section 33 (ii) and (iii) and the death penalty would 
therefore fail to survive constitutional muster. 
1. CONCLUSION: "ADVANTAGES OF A REVAMPED- RESIDUAL 
ADULT?" 
Previously I argued that negating the essential content of a right was a 
vague, unexplored and unworkable concept. Failed opportunities to 
solidify the concept by real life bombardments in Court increased the 
chances of the infant's untimely demise1169). The dangers inherent in such 
an unworkable limitation clause could include the possibility that due to 
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interpretative complexities the essential content of a right could become 
an insurmountable obstacle for the State rendering all rights absolute in 
practice. The brow of academic opinion concluded that the orphan was 
merely a 11paper tiger11 - figurehead of little significance<170l. This was 
despite the express albeit problematic 11physical11 presence of the infant. 
Furthermore the working draft of the Constitution's version (see Section 
35(1)(b)) has succeeded in converting an already riddled concept into a 
maze of philosophical and esoteric permutations. 
Elaborating on the germ of hope enunciated by LANGA J <171>, 
MADALA J 11721 ' MOKGORO J <173>' O'REAGAN J 11741 ' Dtoc;;orr J (175)' 
MAHOMED J <176l, SACHS 1177), and MARAIS J <178) I have attempted to marry 
and extend their submissions to incorporate a value - residual approach 
to interpretation. 
In summary the advantages of such an approach would include: 
A THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF OUR OWN VALUES 
EPITOMISING A GENUINE 11HOMEGROWN11 QUALITY. 
B THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BACKBONE OF COMPATIBILITY AND 
CONSISTENCY PERMEATING THROUGHOUT THE CONSTITUTION 
LINKING THE PREAMBLE, SECTION 35(1), THE REVAMPED 
SECTION 33(1)(a) AND THE POSTAMBLE. 
C THE EMPHASIS OF ASCERTAINABLE CORE RESIDUAL VALUES 
TO FACILITATE AND SIMPLIFY INTERPRETATION. 
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D A HEALTHY AND SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUES 
AND PROPORTIONALITY COMMENCING WITH THE MOST VITAL 
ENQUIRY. 
E THE TRANSFORMATION OF AN OTHERWISE DOOMED INFANT 
INTO A POROUS, TRANSPARENT, VALUE IMBIBING AND 
FUNCTIONAL ADULT. 
In conclusion, it is hoped that the once "clawless paper tiger"(179) has achieved 
one goal during his traumatic existence. If only to provide a spring-board to 
spark future debate on the unsuitability and potentially fatal consequences of 
retaining complex borrowed provisions - "That legal theory and practice can still 
not give truly practical meaning to (the provision) after more than 40 years ... 11<180) 
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